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NOTES
LIMITATIONS ON THE CONGRESSIONAL
POWER OF INVESTIGATION
INTRODUCTION
"The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to
its legislative function." I The obvious desirability of an informed Con-
gress and electorate to which Woodrow Wilson was referring, together
with the separate and equal status of the legislative powers within
the constitutional framework, has resulted in a legislature with extensive
power to obtain information which it deems necessary to the intelli-
gent exercise of its function. Yet the right to acquire information does
not necessarily carry with it unbridled discretion in the choice of
means and sources to be used. In addition to the limitations imposed
by co-equal executive and judiciary branches of the federal govern-
ment, respect must be accorded the rights and powers reserved to the
people and the states under the Bill of Rights.
With the adoption in 1857 of a statute2 imposing criminal penalties
for failure to comply with a legislative fact-finding body, the courts
acquired the delicate task of reconciling congressional power with
individual rights. It was not until the congressional investigations of
Communist and subversive activities during the decade following World
War II that serious doubts arose concerning the prevailing judicial
policy of non-intervention in the affairs of Congress.
In Watkins v. United States3 the Supreme Court first gave extensive
consideration to the objections raised by witnesses wh6 refused to com-
ply with congressional demands. In that case the conviction was reversed
on a procedural point, but the flavor of the opinion, particularly the
*This note is a sequel to Note, Congressional Investigations: Imbroglio in the Court,
8 WM. & MARY L. REv. 400 (1967). Frequent reference will be made to the former
part, hereafter cited as Note.
1. WisoN, CoNGREssioNAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1885). This passage has found its way
into Supreme Court opinions, although limited to its historical context. "Wilson was
speaking not of a congressional inquiry roaming at large, but of one that inquired into
and discussed the functions and operations of government." Russell v. United States,
369 U. S. 749, 788 (1962). See United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 43 (1953); Watkins
v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 200 n. 33 (1957).
2. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 1, 11 Star. 798. The present form of this statute is
in2 U.S.C. § 192.
3. 354 U. S. 178 (1957). See Note at 411.
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discussion of'-the First Amendment argument, raised serious doubts
about the constitutional propriety of the committee procedures. Ap-
pearances proved to be deceptive, however, when two years later the
same Court, in a five-to-four decision, went in the other direction in
Barenblatt v. United States,4 and gave its approval to the purpose and
procedures of the House of Representatives Committee of Un-American
Activities. In subsequent cases a divided Court has fluctuated between
the blanket approval of Barenblatt, and reversal on narrow procedural
grounds as in Watkins.
The great majority of convictions for contempt of Congress in the
past twenty years have resulted from investigations by the House Un-
American Activities Committee. The primary objections which repeated-
ly have been made against the constitutional validity of this com-
mittee and the contempt convictions have been (1) that the commit-
tee investigation was not serving a legitimate legislative purpose, (2) that
the committee's charter did not authorize such investigations, (3) that the
questions asked were not pertinent to the subject of the investigations
as required by the criminal statute, and (4) that the investigations
violated the First AmendmentY The following discussion will attempt
to present the current posture of the courts on these issues, primarily
with reference to the House Un-American Activities Committee.
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
Since McGrain v. Daugherty6 the power of Congress to investigate
in aid of legislation has not been seriously challenged. Stated negatively,
the maxim is that Congress may not investigate where no valid legisla-
tive purpose would be served. While this requirement apparently limits
the scope of permissible inquiry, its application by courts has removed
most, if not all, prohibitory content. A typical preamble to court opin-
ions on this subject appears in Watkins v. United States:
The power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the
legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries con-
cerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possi-
bly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, eco-
4. 360 U. S. 109 (1959). See Note at 413.
5. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was given broad applica-
tion in regard to congressional investigations in Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155
(1955), and its companion case, Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190 (1955), and has
since been a bar to virtually any interrogation.
6. 273 U.S. 135 (1927). See Note at 404.
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nomic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to
remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But, broad
as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general
authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justifi-
cation in terms of the functions of Congress.7
With an eye to this deceptive limitation, a frequent objection posed
by witnesses protesting contempt citations has been that no valid leg-
islative purpose existed. With the exception of Kilbourn v. Thomp-
soiz, s this contention has never succeeded. The courts with conspicuous
consistency have permitted congressional investigations to expose the
private affairs of individuals so long as there was somewhere recited a
legislative purpose.
In ferreting out the 'red menace,' congressional committees have left
few stones unturned. Investigations have probed into education,' re-
ligion,10 and the press." In view of the First Amendment freedoms of
speech, press, religion, and assembly, which are applicable to congres-
sional investigations,' 2 and the dubious pronouncement that Congress
cannot investigate where it cannot legislate,1 3 the question arises as to
whether a valid legislative purpose can underlie such inquiries. In re-
futing this argument, courts have pointed out that its speciousness lies
in its unarticulated assumption that only invalid legislation could re-
sult from information so obtained. "Congress obviously can use infor-
mation gathered by this Committee to pass legislation not encroaching
upon civil liberties. . . . [And furthermore] Congress can and should
legislate to curtail this freedom [speech] at least where there is a
7. Supra note 3 at 187.
8. 103 US. 168 (1880). See Note at 403.
9. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 4 at 121, 122.
10. See BucKLEY, THE COMMITTEE AND ITS CRITIcs 301, 302 (1962) for a summary of the
committee's investigations into Communist methods of infiltration and subversion of
churches and religious organizations.
11. Communist infiltration of the press was the subject of hearings held by the Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee in 1955 and 1956. The hearings are discussed in Bendich,
First Amendment Standards for Congressional Investigation, 51 CAL. L. REv. 311 (1963),
which discusses in particular the contempt conviction of a New York Times employee.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 (D. D. C. 1957) aff'd, 280 F. 2d 701 (D. C.
Cir. 1960), rev'd, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
12. Watkins v. United States, supra note 3 at 197; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S.
41, 44 (1953).
13. Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra note 8; Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 775,
776 (1962) (concurring opinion).
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'clear and present danger' that its exercise would... imperil the coun-
try and its Constitutional system . ,, 14 Consistent with this line of
reasoning, the Supreme Court stated, in affirming the conviction of a
college teacher:
Of course, broadly viewed, inquiries cannot be made into the teach-
ing that is pursued in any of our educational institutions .... But this
does not mean that the Congress is precluded from interrogating a
witness merely because he is a teacher. An educational institution is
not a constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into matters that may
otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain merely for
the reason that inquiry is made of someone within its walls.'15
The logical extension of this argument is that since Congress can initiate
amendments to the Constitution, inquiries into the nature and work-
ings of "inalienable rights" are within its domain.16
It is difficult to conceive of an area of society that cannot be directly
or indirectly affected by legislative action. It follows that the Bill of
Rights does not bar congressional action within the proscribed free-
doms. The problem becomes one of gauging how far Congress may
encroach upon individual liberties. It is in this context-the balancing
of the interests of the state with the interests of the individual-that
the First Amendment prohibitions have been handled by the courts.
Yet in spite of the ubiquitous legislative purpose, the view that
Congress cannot investigate in the area of speech and association is
not without authoritative adherents. Their arguments, however, have
been confined to dissenting opinions. Dissenting in Barenblatt v.
United States,'7 Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas and Chief
Justice Warren concurred, reasoned that the First Amendment pre-
vented any legislative encroachment upon its domain regardless of
purpose. Concurring in Russell v. United States,'8 Justice Douglas
argued that since Congress cannot regulate in the area of the First
Amendment, investigation in those areas cannot be justified in terms
14. United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. den., 333 U.S.
838 (1948); accord, Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241, 251, cert. den., 334 U.S. 843
(1948).
15. Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 4 at 112.
16. See Barsky v. United States, supra note 14 at 246.
17. Supra note 4 at 151. See also Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 415 (1961);
Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 438 (1961) (dissenting opinions).
18. Supra note 13.
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of a legislative function, even though the information might prove
useful in related areas.
Conceding that any congressional investigation might conceivably
be useful in enacting legislation, statements of committee members
give rise to more than a suspicion that the primary goal of the Un-
American Activities Committee is exposure rather than useful informa-
tion.19 This conclusion is reinforced by the practice of the committee,
as illustrated by Wilkinson v. United States,20 of summoning witnesses
from whom no helpful information can be expected. It was on this
basis that Justice Brennan filed separate dissents in Barenblatt and
Wilkinson, and it was an additional ground for the dissents in both
cases of Justices Black, Douglas, and Warren. From the committee's
record, the inference is compelling that "the chief aim, purpose and
practice of the House Un-American Activities Committee, as disclosed
by its many reports, is to try witnesses and punish them because they
are or have been Communists or because they refuse to admit or deny
Communist affiliations. The punishment imposed is generally punish-
ment by humiliation and public shame." 21 Punishment is the function
of the judiciary, and it was a usurping of the powers of the courts
which was unabashedly struck down in Kilbourn v. Thompson.22
Since that case courts with little difficulty have managed to find a
19. Examples of the countless public statements made by members of the committee
are listed in an appendix to Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Barenblatt v. United
States, supra note 4 at 163. The flavor of these pronouncements is exemplified by the
following:
"[Tio inform the American people of the activities of any such organizations
is the real purpose of the House Committee." "The purpose of this committee is the
task of protecting our constitutional democracy by turning the light of pitiless pub-
licity on [these] organizations." H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1-2, 24 (1940).
In reversing the conviction of a labor union official on the ground that the subject of
the inquiry was never specified, the Supreme Court cited statements of the chairman
which included the candid revelation:
"[Rep. Francis E. Walter (D. Pa.)] ...said today he plans to hold large public
hearings in industrial communities where subversives are known to be operating, and
to give known or suspected commies a chance in a full glare of publicity to deny or
affirm their connection with a revolutionary conspiracy-or to take shelter behind con-
stitutional amendments.
"By this means, he said, active communists will be exposed before their neighbors
and fellow workers, 'and I have every confidence that the loyal Americans who work
with them will do the rest of the job.'" Gojack v. United States, 86 S. Ct. 1689, 1694
(1966). See Note at 400.
20. Supra note 17 at 414, 415. See Note at 414, 415.
21. Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 4 at 153 (dissenting opinion).
22. Supra note 8.
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valid legislative purpose. In McGrain v. Daugherty23 such a purpose
was presumed. Sinclair v. United States24 offset the presumption of
regularity by the presumption of innocence attending the accused in
criminal prosecutions, and made it incumbent upon the government
to plead and prove proper purpose. In subsequent cases this burden
has been met by a recital somewhere in the congressional records that
legislation might result from the investigations. 5 The fact that com-
mittee members make contradictory and irresponsible statements has
failed to faze the courts:
But we have no occasion now to decide whether a Congressional
investigation may have exposure as its principle goal or when, if ever, a
statute may. It is sufficient to say that the authorizing statute contains
the declaration of Congress that the information sought is for a
legislative purpose and that fact is thus established for us . . . re-
gardless of any statement by the Committee or its members intimating
the contrary. The fact that there may be 'exposure' incidental to the
inquiry goes only to the question of freedom of speech... [Citations
omitted] .26
In Barenblatt a similar attitude was expressed by the majority: "So
long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the
Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which
spurred the exercise of that power." 27 Citing McCray v. United
States 8 with approval, the Court declared that the remedy for the
lawful exercise of a power perverted by improper motive lies with
the people rather than the Judiciary. 9
That the court would be reluctant to delve into the morass of con-
gressional motivation is understandable. The prospect of unraveling
the proper from the improper motives would indeed be boggling in
most cases. But the argument that the Judiciary lacks the authority
to indulge in the psychoanalysis of congressional committees assumes
too much. When the exercise of legislative power accomplishes ends
23. Supra note 6.
24. 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
25. See, e.g., Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1938), and Note at
404, n.25.
26. United States v. Josephson, supra note 14.
27. Supra note 4 at 132; accord, Watkins v. United States, supra note 3 at 200.
28. 195 U. S. 27 (1904).
29. Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 4 at 132, 133; accord, Barsky v. United
States, supra note 14 at 250.
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inconsistent with the ostensible purpose of the action, the distinction
between purpose and motive becomes an exercise in semantics. How-
ever, it would be both unwise and unnecessary for a court to nullify
a congressional investigation on the tenuous ground of improper pur-
pose when more defensible positions are available. It is the trespass on
the domain of the Judiciary and the First Amendment freedoms which
renders the action improper, and either constitutional objection could
be supported by reason and precedent.
The unfortunate effect of the Courts' position is illustrated by the
sophistical argument of the Chairman of the Un-American Activities
Committee, Representative Willis of Louisiana, while defending the
proposed investigation of the Ku Klux Klan on the floor of the House:
The time has come, I believe, to give a factual and a legal answer
to the charge sometimes made against the Committee on Un-American
Activities that it engages in investigations in order to expose for ex-
posure's sake....
As we all know, committees of Congress can make investigations
and hold hearings only in aid of a legislative purpose, and where that
legislative purpose is not present, a committee's action may be success-
fully challenged.
The easiest and most penetrating challenge which can be made to
the purposes of a congressional committee is in the Federal courts in
criminal cases growing out of its hearings .... [T]he courts require
that a committee before whom a contempt or perjury is charged not
only must be pursuing a legislative purpose at that time, but the execu-
tive arm of the Government in order to make a successful prosecution
in court must carry the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the committee had such a legislative purpose....
It is my information, based upon what those who have studied
the matter have advised me, that in not one single case of a citation
to the courts for contempt of Congress have the courts ever found
lacking a legislative purpose for any committee's investigation. This
is to the very great credit of both Houses of Congress. And when I
say that, I include, of course, the Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities.3o
At least the Chairman was not misinformed.
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION
Granting that Congress has the authority to conduct investigations
in aid of legislation, the question remains whether a particular investi-
30. 111 GONG. REc. 8027 (daily ed., Apr. 14, 1965).
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gation is within the bounds of its constitutional authority. When Con-
gress delegates its authority to an investigative committee, there is in
addition the question of whether a particular undertaking of the com-
mittee is within the authority conferred upon it. When a subcom-
mittee is involved, the issue is refined still further. This chain of au-
thority from the Constitution to the inquisitor clearly makes congres-
sional investigations vulnerable to judicial rear-attacks, and the history
of legislative fact-finding bodies is not without a casualty list. In
Kilbourn v. Thompson,31 the Supreme Court found that an investiga-
tion was without the constitutional authority of Congress. In United
States v. Rumely,32 the High Bench held that a select House com-
mittee authorized to investigate lobbying activities lacked authority
to investigate efforts to influence public opinion. In United States v.
Kamin,33 a Senate subcommittee authorized to investigate government
operations was found lacking in jurisdiction to investigate defense
plants privately owned and operated. United States v. Lamont,34 in-
volving facts similar to Kamin, dismissed indictments for contempt of
Congress when the trial court found that, inter alia, they failed to
allege either the source of the subcommittee's authority or that the in-
vestigation was within the authority conferred by Congress. The cir-
cuit court affirmed the ruling,35 citing the Kamin case, since even if
the indictments were sustained, the prosecution would fail because
authority was in fact absent. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,36 the
Court found no clear delegation of authority to investigate classroom
teachings and beliefs of a Communist sympathizer. In Gojack v. United
States,37 the Supreme Court found that the subcommittee investigation
was never authorized as required by the rules of the Un-American
Activities Committee.
31. Supra note 8.
32. Supra note 12. See Note at 410.
33. 136 F. Supp. 791 (D.C. Mass. 1956). This case, another contempt conviction, arose
when defendant refused to disclose his communist associates before a subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Government Operations. The Subcommittee was empowered
to investigate "the operation of Government activities of all levels with a view to
determining its economy and efficiency." Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, c.
753, § 102 (g) (2) (B). The court held that the jurisdiction of the committee was
limited to government activity, and not private industry acting under government con-
tracts.
34. 18 F.R.D. 27 (S.D. N.Y. 1955), aft'd, 236 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1956).
35. Id.
36. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
37. Supra note 19.
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The authority of any congressional committee must devolve from
Congress. Its jurisdiction is embodied in the authorizing resolution, the
purpose of which is to define the limits of the power conferred, and
how and for what purpose that power is to be used.3 8 When authority is
lacking, a contempt conviction would be a denial of due process under
the Fifth Amendment.
Initially, investigatory commissions expired when the investigation
ceased, and their usefulness was likewise limited. The advantages of
permanent investigating committees-competent staff, stability, conti-
nuity, and efficiency-were apparent. The difficulties inherent in the
delegation of broad powers include the possibility that it may afford no
standard of conduct to the committee and defy meaningful interpreta-
tion for the purpose of supervision by either Congress or the courts.
In the extreme case, a vague authorization may be totally ineffective,
since by authorizing any inquiry it may be voided by the courts.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 19463 9 was enacted with a
view to establishing permanent committees with broad powers. In-
cluded therein was the Un-American Activities Committee, with the
authorizing resolution of the 1938 Special Committee and the 1945
Standing Committee adopted substantially intact.40 This authorization
is the epitome of vagueness, and the controversy it has spawned in
the courts makes it clear why its author has never taken a bow. In
the Watkins case, Chief Justice Warren assailed its ambiguity:
It would be difficult to imagine a less explicit authorizing resolution.
Who can define the meaning of 'un-American'? What is that single,
solitary 'principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our
Constitution'?41
These words, however, were in vain:
At one time, perhaps, the resolution might have been read narrowly
38. Watkins v. United States, supra note 3 at 201.
39. Legislative Reorganization Act, ch. 753, 5 121(a), (b), 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
40. "The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is
authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and
objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion
within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated
from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of
government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation
thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." H. Res. 5,
Rule XI, § 17 (b), 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CoNG. Rxc. 18 (1953).
41. Watkins v. United States, supra note 3 at 202.
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to confine the Committee to the subject of propaganda. The events
that have transpired in the fifteen years before the interrogation of
petitioner make such a construction impossible at this date.42
In support of his conclusion, the Chief Justice pointed out that the
House has repeatedly approved the committee's excursions by renewing
its charter when on a special committee basis, by elevating it to stand-
ing committee status, by incorporating it into the rules of the House,
and by innumerable appropriations for its support.
That reasonable men might differ about the vagueness of the resolu-
tion is illustrated by the opinion in Barsky v. United States:
It is said that the resolution is too vague to be valid. Perhaps the
one phrase 'Un-American propaganda activities', taken alone.. . would
be subject to that condemnation. But the clause, above quoted, 'subver-
sive and un-American propaganda that . . . attacks the principle of
the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution' . . . is
definite enough. It conveys a clear meaning, and that is all that
is required.43
The first series of cases raising the constitutional questions concern-
ing the Committee in the period between 1947 and 1950 were disposed
of at the Court of Appeals level." The question of authority was
handled in each case with language similar to that in the Barsky case,
and the Supreme Court was content to let the opinions stand. Those
cases that did reach the High Tribunal4 were disposed of without
reaching the basic issues. The Watkins case was the first attempt by the
Supreme Court to deal with the conundrum of constitutional issues,
and there only by way of dicta.
In the Barenblatt case, the petitioner again raised the problem of
vagueness, relying on the strong language of the Watkins decision.
Barenblatt's contentions on this point were twofold; the first being
that the authorizing resolution was wholly ineffective, and the second,
that if the resolution were effective to confer some authority, this
authority did not include investigation into Communist activities.
As to the first contention, Justice Harlan, writing the majority opin-
ion, ably pointed out that the Watkins language implied more than it
42. Id.
43. Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241, 247, 248, cert. den., 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
44. See Note at 408.
45. See Note at 410, n.50.
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said. Rather, the Court in the Watkins case "drew upon Rule XI [the
authorizing resolution] only as one of the facets in the total mise en
scene in its search for the 'question under inquiry' in that particular
investigation." 46
While it is no doubt true that Watkins said less than Barenblatt
contended, it is likewise misleading to construe the discussion in Wat-
kins of the problem of authority presented by the vague authoriza-
tion 4 7 as subordinate to the discussion of the pertinency requirements. 8
It would be more accurate to say that the problem of pertinency which
controlled in Watkins was one of the difficulties presented by a vague
authorization. It is this latter interpretation which prompted the dis-
senting opinion of two judges, Edgerton and Bazelon, in the circuit
court reaffirmation of Barenblatt's conviction,49 which had been re-
manded for consideration in the light of Watkins. Strictly speaking it
could be said that Watkins left open the question of authority.
Justice Harlan disposed of both of petitioner's contentions by re-
butting the second, since authority to investigate Communist activities
was sufficient to uphold the conviction. The Court's first argument was
implied by the statement: "We cannot agree with the contention
[that authority to investigate Communism was lacking] which in its
farthest reach would mean that the House Un-American Activities
Committee under its existing authority has no right to compel testimony
in any circumstances." 50 The apparent inference of this statement is
that if the committee had any authority, it was to investigate Com-
munist activities, and if no such authority in fact existed the charter
was void from its inception in 1938. This conclusion, to the court a
reductio ad absurdum, was indeed Barenblatt's contention. Yet its ab-
surdity lay not in its internal logic, but rather in the effect it would
have if sustained.
The Court, by its own doing, was in the embarrassing position of
ruling for the first time on the validity of an authorizing resolution,
certainly as objectionable as any the Court had yet encountered, which,
in its twenty year existence, has supported more than forty convic-
tions.51
46. Barenblatr v. United States, supra note 4 at 117.
47. Supra note 3 at 200-206.
48. Id. at 206-215.
49. Barenblatt v. United States, 252 F. 2d 129, 136-138 (D. C. Cir. 1958).
50. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 117 (1959).
51. See BacK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS 217 (1958).
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The Court's solution was inevitable:
Granting the vagueness of the Rule, we may not read it in isolation
from its long history in the House of Representatives. Just as legislation
is often given meaning by the gloss of legislative reports, administrative
interpretation, and long usage, so the proper meaning of an authoriza-
tion to a congressional committee is not to be derived alone from its
abstract terms unrelated to the definite content furnished them by the
course of congressional actions. The Rule comes to us with a 'per-
suasive gloss of legislative history' . . . which shows beyond doubt
that in pursuance of its legislative concerns in the domain of 'national
security' the House has clothed the Un-American Activities Committee
with pervasive authority to investigate Communist activities in this
country.,52 [Citations omitted.]
This statement represents the final deposition of the problem of au-
thority as it relates to Communist activities and, no doubt, activities of
organizations under investigation during World War II. 5 In this con-
clusion the Court is undoubtedly on firm ground. The committee had
been operating under its charter for more than fifteen years before
Barenblatt's appearance. While in the Rumely case the approval by
Congress of the actions of the Select Committee on Lobbying Activi-
ties occurred after the appearance of defendant Rumely, and therefore
had the effect of "post litem motam, self-serving declarations," 5' such
was not the case with Barenblatt.55
The argument that the High Tribunal cannot now do what it should
have done at the first opportunity, while no doubt true, merits a pass-
ing criticism. Invalidating the authorization in 1948, assuming political
feasibility,5 6 would have at least forced Congress to reconsider the de-
sirability of its brainchild. If it resulted in a more explicit authorization,
it would have alleviated much of the problem of pertinency troubling
the court in Watkins, and subsequent cases. Not the least of its salutory
effects, it would have prevented the justification of abuse of power by a
process of "retroactive rationalization" 57 demonstrated in Watkins and
Barenblatt.
The problem of authority was far from settled, however, by the
52. Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 50 at 117, 118.
53. See id. at 118.
54. Rumely v. United States, supra note 12 at 48.
55. Supra note 50 at 121, 122.
56. See Note at 409.
57. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 204 (1957).
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Barenblatt decision. As illustrated by Gojack v. United States,"s attacks
on the authority of subcommittees are not precluded.
The latest-and most ironic-development in this area of authority
is the September 13, 1966, conviction of Robert M. Shelton, head of
the Ku Klux Klan, who was summoned by the House Un-American
Activities Committee to appear October 19, 1965, and bring with him
all the records of the Klan and related organizations. The purpose
of the Klan investigation was to determine if any legislation in this area
was necessary29 Shelton appeared, but refused to produce the records
on the grounds that the information was not germane to the subject of
the investigation, that it would not aid Congress in considering valid
legislation, and that it was not within the scope of the authorizing
resolution of the committee. ° Shelton also relied on the Fifth Amend-
ment when questioned about his Klan activities. In spite of his con-
tentions a contempt conviction resulted."'
On appeal the defense will no doubt bring up the question of au-
thority, since the Klan investigation was the first time the Committee
had investigated non-Communist activities in twenty years. At least in
one sense of the word, the Ku Klux Klan is as "American" as the com-
mittee itself, and an investigation by the Un-American Activities Com-
mittee is, at first glance, somewhat ludicrous.6 While the investigation
58. Supra note 19.
59. 112 CoNG. RErc 1658 (daily ed., Feb. 2, 1966).
60. Id. at 1659, 1660.
61. See The New York Times, Sept. 14, 1966, p. 39, col. 1.
62. To rebut this apparent inconsistency Representative Willis of Louisiana, Chairman
of the committee, presented the following argument:
MR. WILLIS. Mr. Speaker, it has been suggested that the Committee on Un-
American Activities is not the proper committee to investigate the Ku Klux Klans.
I am convinced that it has clear authority to do so, that its mandate is unmis-
takable on this point.
Foreignisms-such as Nazism, fascism, and communism-are not the only ideolo-
gies which are un-American, a threat to our national security and to the preserva-
tion of our democratic form of government...
"Any group that engages in organized large-scale intimidation in the political,
economic and social fields and terrorizes individuals and groups, attacks the very
root of the democratic process. It does so because it destroys freedom and, without
free citizens, our representative form of government is not secure and cannot
be preserved.
When large numbers of people in any part of our country . . .fear physical,
economic or social injury if they dare to speak as they honestly feel . . . then,
I say, the very foundation of our form of government is being attacked,
weakened and undermined. If such a condition is allowed to continue and to
spread, it could lead eventually to the end of the form of government guaranteed
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may appear to be beyond the authority of the committee due to the
lack of a "gloss of legislative history," the problem is complicated by
the fact that the House of Representatives, prior to the investigations,
voted an appropriation specifically designated for the committee's Klan
investigation.O If this House resolution was sufficient to expand the
authority of the committee, the Klan investigation heralds a new di-
mension in congressional investigations. In addition to the Klan, the
committee is considering an investigation of the Minutemen, the Amer-
ican Nazi Party, and the Black Muslims." It was also suggested by
more than one member of the House that the committee investigation
should ferret out the "Red tinge" in several civil rights organizations.65
Investigation of civil rights organizations is highly unlikely, however,
in view of the Supreme Court's position in Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Committee.66 In that case the court invalidated a state in-
vestigation of Communist influence in the Miami branch of the
N.A.A.C.P. on the First and Fourteenth amendment grounds, since
there was no evidence of a substantial relationship between that organi-
zation and subversive activities.
PERTINENCY
Statutory Pertinency
The relevant parts of the criminal contempt statute, 2 U.S.C. § 192,
provide that:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the au-
thority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce
papers upon any matter under inquiry... willfully makes default, or
who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the
question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor....
[Emphasis added.]
by our Constitution and to the imposition of a national tyranny based on fear
in its stead. ,11 CoNG. REc. 8024 (daily ed., Apr. 14,1965).
Apparently the "Liberal" from Louisiana did not see the uncanny resemblance between
his argument and the arguments advanced against the constitutionality of the Un-
American Activities Committee by its critics, including three members of the Supreme
Court. See Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 50 at 145 (dissenting opinion).
63. 111 CoNG. REc. 8024 (daily ed., Apr. 14, 1965).
64. Id. at 8026.
65. Id. at 8022.
66. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
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The starting point for determining pertinency-and the most trouble-
some aspect of the problem-is establishing the subject of the inquiry.°7
Assuming that the "question under inquiry" has been established with
sufficient precision, pertinency of the unanswered question or the re-
quested papers to the matter under inquiry becomes the controlling
element in determining whether an offense has been committed.
The witness is justified in refusing to answer irrelevant questions, but
he acts at his peril. The question of pertinency is a question of law
for the courts to determine, and the utmost good faith on the part of
the witness in concluding that information sought is not relevant will
not justify his refusal if the court thinks otherwise. 8
With few exceptions, Courts have little difficulty in determining
statutory pertinency, giving it a liberal interpretation as exemplified by
the opinion in Townsend v. United States:69 "A judicial inquiry re-
lates to a case, and the evidence to be admissible must be measured by
the narrow limits of the pleadings. A legislative inquiry anticipates all
possible cases which may arise thereunder and the evidence admissible
must be responsive to the scope of the inquiry, which generally is very
broad." Nor has any formulistic test been necessary: "The matter for
determination in this case was whether the facts called for by the ques-
tion were so related to the subjects covered by the Senate's resolutions
that such facts reasonably could be said to be 'pertinent to the question
under inquiry.' " 70
Where a question is not clearly pertinent on its face nor from its
content as gleaned from the record of the hearing, the Government
may bring in background information for consideration by the court.7 '
In spite of this latitude allowed the prosecution, in cases where there
was genuine doubt as to the relevancy of the question the convictions
have failed. Bowers v. United States72 arose from a Senate subcommit-
tee investigation of organized crime in interstate commerce. The court
held that questions concerning the witness' activities in Chicago and
Florida were not made relevant to the topic of interstate activities by
67. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 407 (1961); Deutch v. United States,
367 U.S. 456, 469 (1961).
68. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298, 299 (1929); Watkins v. United States,
supra note 57 at 208.
69. 95 F. 2d 352, 361 (D. C. Cir.), cert. den., 303 U.S. 664 (1938).
70. Sinclair v. United States, supra note 68 at 299.
71. Bowers v. United States, 202 F. 2d 447, 450, 453 (D. C. Cir. 1953); Deutch v.
United States, supra note 67 at 473 (dissenting opinion).
72. Id.
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either the transcript of the testimony or by extrinsic evidence. In Deutch
v. United States,73 the questions which the petitioner was convicted of
refusing to answer [concerning his student activities at Cornell] ob-
viously had nothing to do with the Albany area or with Communist
infiltration into labor unions." 74 These cases suggest a narrower con-
cept of pertinency than had been previously applied. Although a
strict pertinency requirement has frustrated attempts to convict, it is
not difficult as a practical approach. As explained in Bowers v. United
States:75
It will not do to say the questions were preliminary in nature
and, had they been answered, would have led to and been followed by
questions plainly pertinent, for on that theory pertinency need never
be shown in a prosecution under the statute. It could always be said
the questions were preliminary.
Considering the fact that the contempt of Congress is a criminal of-
fense, it is not unreasonable to require that pertinency be established
beyond a reasonable doubt."0 Nor is it reasonable to impose criminal
sanctions for withholding information of little or no benefit to a com-
mittee's line of inquiry.77
Due Process and the Pertinency Requirement
The Watkins decision brought out another aspect of the pertinency
requirement closely related to the problem of authority of congres-
sional committees. The Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment
does not permit a conviction for refusal to answer a question before a
congressional committee, unless the committee had the authority to obtain
the type of information sought. If a question is not pertinent to the sub-
ject of inquiry as stated in the authorizing resolution of the committee or
subcommittee, an attempted conviction for contempt would fail on two
grounds. First, the statutory element of pertinency would be lacking.
Second, the committee lacked jurisdiction to inquire into the area to
75. Supra note 67.
74. Id. at 470. The finding of pertinency in the lower courts and by two dissenters,
Justices Whittaker and Clark, of the Supreme Court, was based upon a broader in-
terpretation of the subject under inquiry. Deutch v. United States, 280 F. 2d 691, 695
(D. C. Cir. 1961); Deutch v. United States, supra note 67.
75. Supra note 71 at 452.
76. See Watkins v. United States, supra note 57 at 278; Flaxer v. United States, 158
U.S. 147, 151 (1938).
77. See Bowers v. United States, supra note 71 at 448.
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which the question related. The latter idea was characterized in the
Watkins case as the "jurisdictional concept of pertinency." 78
A second aspect of Due Process requirement arises where the au-
thorizing resolution is too vague to permit delineation of the authority
of a committee. Due Process requires that a criminal statute be suffi-
ciently precise to apprise a defendant of the nature of the offense.' 9
Under the contempt statute a "question under inquiry" is an essential
ingredient of the pertinency requirement. It is necessary to refer to
sources outside the statute to determine the subject of the inquiry, the
most logical source being the authorizing resolution of the committee. A
vague charter such as that of the Un-American Activities Committee,
while perhaps sufficient to confer authority, hardly satisfies the standard
of precision required for criminal statutes. It is not surprising that wit-
nesses cited for contempt of Congress have assailed doggedly the au-
thorizing resolution, incorporated by reference in the criminal statute,
as lacking a sufficient standard of criminality. Since a witness may
rightfully refuse to answer a question not pertinent to the investiga-
tion, he "is entitled to have knowledge of the subject to which the
interrogation is deemed pertinent.., with the same degree of explicit-
ness and clarity that the Due Process clause requires in the expression
of any element of a criminal offense." so
The defense of a lack of a standard of criminality was initially over-
come by finding that the authorizing resolution of the Un-American
Activities Committee "conveys a clear meaning . . .,,,s and that "there
was no misapprehension [on the part of the witness] as to what was
called for." '2 A more realistic approach was devised in Watkins, where
Chief Justice Warren indicated sources other than the authorizing resolu-
tion which may be used to shed light on the question under inquiry.
These sources include remarks by the committee members during the
course of the hearings, and even the nature of the proceedings them-
selves. In Watkins none of these criteria proved adequate. As a future
guide to courts and committees, the Chief Justice laid down a new set
of procedural rules, and a new standard of pertinency applicable when a
witness objects to a question on the grounds of pertinency:
Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with undisputable
78. Watkins v. United States, supra note 57 at 206.
79. Id. at 208.
80. Id. at 208, 209.
81. Barsky v. United States, supra note 43 at 247.
82. Id. at 248.
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clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body, upon objection
of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the record
the subject under inquiry at that time and the manner in which
the propounded questions are pertinent thereto. To be meaningful, the
explanation must describe what the topic under inquiry is and the con-
nective reasoning whereby the precise questions asked relate to it.8 3
Implicit in this directive is the ruling in Quinn v. United States that
"unless the witness is clearly apprised that the committee demands his
answer notwithstanding his objections, there can be no conviction
under § 192 for refusal to answer that question." 84
The procedural outline of the Watkins decision took its toll among
contempt convictions pending in the courts.8 5 The Supreme Court, in
the interval between Watkins and Barenblatt, reversed three convic-
tions relying on Watkins.8 6
Apparently, the requirement that pertinency appear with "undisput-
able clarity" applies only when a witness makes a pertinency ob-
jection.8 7 Yet the Court applied this standard in succeeding cases al-
though no pertinency objection had been raised." In each, the Court
avoided ruling on the effect of a failure to object by finding that perti-
nency was "clear beyond doubt". 9
An example of a pertinency objection being a significant factor oc-
curred in Sacher v. United States ° The petitioner was a lawyer who
was apparently associated with the Communist Party. The avowed
purpose of his interrogation by the Senate Internal Security Subcom-
mittee was to determine why another witness had recanted on testi-
83. Watkins v. United States, supra note 57 at 214, 215.
84. 349 U.S. 155, 166 (1955); accord, United States v. Miller, 259 F. 2d 187 (D. C. Cir.
1958).
85. Singer v. United States, 247 F. 2d 535 (D. C. Cir. 1957); United States v. Peck,
154 F. Supp. 603 (D. D. C. 1957); Miller v. United States, id., see same case below,
152 F. Supp. 781 (D. D. C. 1957); Watson v. United States, 280 F. 2d 689 (D. C. Cir.
1960); Knowles v. United States, 280 F. 2d 696 (D. C. Cir. 1960).
86. Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958); Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147
(1958); Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959).
87. See Deutch v. United States, supra note 67 at 469; Barenblatt v. United States,
supra note 50 at 124. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 380, 381 (1960) (pertinency
of subpoenaed records).
88. Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 50; Wilkinson v. United States, supra
note 67; Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); McPhaul v. United States, id.
89. Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 50 at 124. See Wilkinson v. United States,
supra note 67 at 413, n. 10.
90. Supra note 86.
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mony he had given at a former hearing. The subcommittee indicated
a suspicion that it was the result of a Communist plot. During the hear-
ing the subcommittee indulged in a "brief excursion" 91 into the possi-
bility of legislation barring Communists from practice at the Federal
bar. Following this digression, clearly beyond the subcommittee's au-
thority, the petitioner refused to inform the panel concerning his
affiliation with the Communist Party. The Court seized upon the un-
authorized digression to reverse the conviction, holding that the ques-
tions were not clearly pertinent to the authorized subject of the investi-
gation. The dissenting opinion of Justices Clark and Whittaker, in
agreement with the circuit court,92 argued persuasively that not only
were the questions clearly pertinent to either subject, but that the
"brief excursion" had obviously terminated before at least one of the
disputed questions had been posed. The circuit court addressed itself
at length to the question of pertinency, concluding that petitioner was
aware of the pertinency beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the
three-judge dissent in the circuit court lends support to the per curiam
reversal by the Supreme Court on this point.
The Sacher case, by giving literal effect to the Watkins formula, il-
lustrated that the Supreme Court did not consider the Due Process re-
quirement of "undisputable clarity" to be as picayune as it appeared.93
Prior to Watkins the courts had uniformly held that there was
no justification for refusing to answer a question that was in fact
pertinent as a matter of law. Thereafter, it became a question of fact
whether the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe the ques-
tions were not pertinent. 4 The test becomes whether "a reasonable
man in the situation of the particular witness would have known
[beyond a reasonable doubt] the question asked was pertinent to the
subject under inquiry." 95
Once a committee has undertaken an explanation of the pertinency
of a question to which the witness objected, any contempt prosecu-
tion must stand or fall on the basis of that explanation." By "freez-
91. Id. at 577.
92. Sacher v. United States, 252 F. 2d 828 (D. C. Cir. 1958).
93. See, e.g., Kalven, Mr. Alexander Mieklejohn and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U.
CmI. L. REv. 315, 322 (1960); Alfange, Congressional Legislations and the Fickle Court,
30 U. of GIN. L. REv. 164 (1961).
94. Sacher v. United States, supra note 92 at 835, rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 576
(1958). Braden v. United States, supra note 88 at 436.
95. Sacher v. United States, id.
96. Deutch v. United States, supra note 67 at 472 (dissenting opinion).
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ing" the issue in this manner the defendant prevents the Government
from asserting at the trial every "subject under inquiry" which the
record might support. It might also be added that by triggering an
explanation from the committee, the witness probably removes any
possibility of challenging a contempt prosecution on grounds of perti-
nency. This clarification of the issue also simplifies the task of the
courts by allevating the tedious process of sifting the records, often
containing ambiguous or conflicting statements, to ascertain the subject
of the investigation. These advantages were recognized by the Supreme
Court in Russell v. United States,97 where the Court required that the
indictment recite the subject of the inquiry regardless of whether the
witness objected on that ground. While the Court's decision was ad-
mittedly influenced by a desire to simplify its task, its primary justifi-
cation was the deprivation of a "basic protection which the guarantee
of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to secure." 's The
majority argued that where no subject was stated in the indictment,
the decision of the grand jury could be based on one theory, the con-
viction on another, and the appellate court decision on still another.
The dissenters, Justices Harlan and Clark, did not deny the validity of
the majority argument, but rather argued that the indictments satisfied
the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the
decision would encourage recusancy of witnesses, and it would perhaps
prompt Congress to revert to its original practice of trying contempt
cases itself.
The Russell decision was supported by cogent reasoning, since the
records of the hearings at which the petitioners testified contain glar-
ing errors when judged by Watkins standards. Yet technically, Watkins
was not controlling precedent, since none of the petitioners had ob-
jected to questions for lack of pertinency. 99
The pertinency problems of the pre-Watkins investigations have
been thoroughly hashed out by the courts, and it is unlikely to present
much of a problem in future cases. With a few exceptions, 1°° the con-
tempt of Congress convictions reviewed by the Supreme Court since
1957 arose from hearings held prior to Watkins. The effect of the
Watkins decision on the Un-American Activities Committee can be
97. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
98. Id. at 770.
99. Id. at 791.
100. Wilkinson v. United States, supra note 67; Braden v. United States, supra note 88;
Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963).
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seen in Wilkinson v. United States,"°' where the committee undertook
a lengthy explanation of the purpose and relevance of a question to
which the witness had objected on the grounds of moral scruples.
The defect highlighted in the Watkins case was easily cured. So long
as the subject is made clear to the witness, there is nothing to prevent
a committee from switching topics between questions if it so desires.
While a subcommittee may be constrained by its specific authoriza-
tion, there is nothing to prevent the delegation by the parent commit-
tee of powers as broad as its own. Spelling out the pertinency of
questions would be a meaningless ritual in most cases. It is hard to
believe that witnesses, particularly those who fail to object, have any
serious doubts about the pertinency of a question concerning their
own Communist activities and associations, when in essence, that is
the subject under inquiry. A recital by the committee that the subject
under inquiry is Communism in education, or labor, or the South, is
not likely to prove much help to a witness unwilling to expose his politi-
cal beliefs and activities to the glare of publicity. The Watkins ruling was
a temporary and inadequate solution to the fundamental problems pre-
sented by a committee free to define its own jurisdiction. The Un-
American Activities Committee, for one, has virtually unlimited dis-
cretion in determining who and what is subversive. It is free to compel
testimony from anyone so long as it pays lip service to a legislative pur-
pose. The fact that most of those "exposed" by the committee have been
connected in some way with Communism is hardly justification for the
hands-off attitude of the courts and Congress.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In Barenblatt v. United States the Supreme Court split into opposing
camps over the meaning of the First Amendment in the context of
legislative investigations. Inevitably the opinions contained more politi-
cal philosophy than black-letter law. While the arguments are some-
what sophisticated, the issue is simple enough: Does congressional inter-
rogation of individuals concerning their knowledge of Communist
Party activities violate the freedoms of speech and association guaran-
teed by the First Amendment? The answer, at least to a narrow major-
ity of the Court, was in the negative.
The majority view in Barenblatt, which has so far prevailed, 102 saw
101. Id.
102. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72 (1959); Wilkinson v. United States, supra note
67; Braden v. United States, supra note 88.
[Vol. 8:630
LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
the problem as one which required a "balancing" of the conflicting in-
dividual and state interests. The minority approach interpreted the
First Amendment as an "absolute" bar to governmental interference
with certain types of political expression, particularly utterances and
activities which are not themselves criminal in nature. This contro-
versy, which has caused considerable comment,1 3 concerns the full
spectrum of first amendment issues, 1 4 congressional investigations be-
ing one aspect of the problem. Only a brief summary of the arguments
and their relation to legislative investigations will be attempted in this
discussion.
Chief exponent of the "absolute" approach, Justice Black, views the
problem in this manner:
The phrase 'Congress shall make no law' is composed of plain words,
easily understood. The Framers knew this....
To my way of thinking, at least, the history and language of the
Bill of Rights ... make it plain that one of the primary purposes of
the Constitution with its amendments was to draw from the Govern-
ment all power to act in certain areas-whatever the scope of those
areas may be. If I am right in this then there is, at least in those areas,
no justification whatever for 'balancing' a particular right against some
expressly granted power of Congress. 0 5
Spokesman for the "balancers," Justice Frankfurter, saw the matter in
a different light.
Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and
such exceptions would eventually corrode the rules. The demands of
free speech in a democratic society are better served by candid and
informed weighing of competing interests, within the confines of the
judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the
non-Euclidean problems to be solved.' 06
103. See generally, MENDESON, Jusrcs BLAcK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICr IN THE
COURT (1961); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y. U. L. Rv., 865 (1960); MEKjoHN,
PoLrIcAL FREEDOm: THE CONSnTUTIONAL PowERs OF THE PEOPLE (1960); Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L. J. 1424 (1962); Mendelson, On the Meaning of
the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. Rav. 821 (1962); Frantz, Is the
First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REv. 729 (1963).
104. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (convictions for conspiracy
under the Smith Act); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (suspected Com-
munist denied admission to the state bar).
105. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y. U. L. REv. 865 (1960).
106. Dennis v. United States, supra note 104 at 524, 525 (concurring opinion).
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Before briefly examining the rationale for the two approaches, it
would be useful to clarify the issue. The "absolutists" do not claim
that the First Amendment is unambiguous. The concepts of "freedom
of speech" or "freedom of the press" are not self-defining, and most of
the uncertainty as to the meaning of the First Amendment involves
the determination of which acts come within these terms.10 7 The crux
of the problem is whether Congress is bound by the first amendment
prohibitions when the act in question falls clearly and admittedly within
the area of the protected freedoms. For example, an editorial opinion in a
newspaper would normally be squarely within the scope of the freedoms
of speech and the press, while an act prohibiting the indiscriminable lit-
tering of the streets with newspapers is a valid regulatory measure only
incidentally fettering freedom of expression.1 s
With respect to congressional investigations it is conceded by both
sides that the First Amendment restrictions apply.'0 9 Nor is it questioned
that certain practices of investigative committees infringe upon speech
and association."' At this point the two approaches part ways.
Upon first impression the "balancing" approach would appear the
more difficult to accept under the mandate that "Congress shall pass no
law. . . ." To support this interpretation it is first argued "that the lan-
guage of the first amendment is highly ambiguous, and that this am-
biguity is at best compounded by history." ' It is of little help to courts
faced with a particular set of facts, and therefore it is necessary to weigh
the interests involved in each case." 2
It is next suggested that the Bill of Rights is not to be interpreted as
law, but rather as a moral admonition to Congress which cannot be en-
forced by the courts.lla It is consonant with a democratic form of
government, and with the concept of judicial restraint, that the electorate
and the legislature should work out solutions to major policy ques-
tions involving deep rooted and conflicting interests." 4 Judicial fiats
107. See Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance, 50 CA. L. Rav. 821 (1962).
108. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
109. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
110. Barenblatt v. United States, id. at 126; accord, Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 90, 91 (1961).
111. Mendelson, supra note 107 at 821.
112. Id. at 825-26.
113. This view was suggested by Judge Learned Hand, HAND SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, 204
(2d ed. 1953).
114. Mendelson, supra note 107 at 827.
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in such areas are not likely to be of much success nor do they enhance
the prestige of the judiciary."' 5
It is also contended that:
Open balancing compels a judge to take full responsibility for his
decisions, and promises a particularized, rational account of how he
arrives at them-more particularized and more refined at least than the
familiar parade of hollowed abstractions, elastic absolutes and selective
history.:"6
A fourth argument of the "balancers" is critical of the "absolute"
approach, and was expressed by Justice Harlan:
Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least
two ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech
is narrower than an unlimited license to talk.... On the one hand
certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has [sic] been
considered outside the scope of constitutional protection .... On the
other hand, general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the
context of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have
not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been
found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests .... 11
To illustrate his point, Justice Harlan observes that the "absolute"
argument "cannot be reconciled with the law relating to libel, slander,
misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false advertising, solicitation of
crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy, and the like." 118
The "absolutists" parry these agreements rather convincingly. First,
while the First Amendment is somewhat vague, the same may be said
of the entire Constitution. In interpreting the Constitution, courts have
been able to ascribe some meaning to its provisions, and the First
Amendment should not be an exception. If it is found to apply to a
particular set of facts, it should be given literal effect. 19
Similarly as to the second argument, if the Bill of Rights is merely
an "admonition," why not the entire Constitution? If the Constitu-
tion were so interpreted, the concept of a government of limited
115. Id. at 827, 828.
116. Id. at 825, 826.
117. Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra note 104 at 49-51 (1961).
118. Id. at 49, n. 10.
119. See Frantz, Is the First Amendmetit Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson,
51 CAL. L. REV. 729, 733-738 (1963).
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powers fails completely. The scope of governmental power becomes
whatever Congress and the Court deem reasonable in the particular
case. 20 It can hardly be considered "judicial restraint" to read out of
the Constitution the concepts it clearly was intended to embody.121
The political force of a Court decree can hardly be gainsaid in light of
recent civil rights cases such as the School Desegregation decision.122
The argument that a "balancing" approach gives a better account of
how a decision was reached is flatly rejected by an examination of
the court's decisions. In Bm'enblatt v. United States,1"  the Court
weighed the "individual constitutional rights at stake" 124 against the
State's "right of self-preservation, 'the ultimate value of any society'," 1'2
and concluded "that the balance between the individual and govern-
mental interests here at stake must be struck in favor of the latter, and
that, therefore, the provisions of the First Amendment have not been
offended." 126 The rationale by which the Court arrived at this con-
clusion was at best simplistic, an inevitable, characteristic judicial bal-
ancing. Assuming all the interests at stake-both individual and state-
could be recognized, the weight ascribed to each would vary with the
individual judge. The information required for a thorough considera-
tion of each factor would clog a computer. That future events will
uphold the wisdom of a particular decision is beyond the realm of in-
formed speculation. 27 The result reached in one case would be of
little value in a future set of circumstances.
Finally, the view that the "absolute" approach is inconsistent with
unshakeable legal theory misunderstands the argument. The distinc-
tion must be kept in mind among (1) regulation of when, where, and
in what manner an individual may speak,12  (2) prohibition of speech
inciting people to commit unlawful acts,129 and (3) restrictions on
120. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L. J. 1424, 1445 (1962).
121. Frantz, supra note 119 at 741, 742.
122. Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Frantz, id. at 745, 746.
123. Supra note 109.
124. Id. at 127.
125. Id. at 128.
126. Id. at 124.
127. See Frantz, supra note 119 at 746-749.
128. Mieklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, THE SUPREME COURT REvimw
-1961, 245, 257 (1961).
129. Justice Holmes was of the opinion that speech should be abridged only where
there is a "clear and present danger" that substantive evils will result. Schenk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Justice Brandeis refined this idea: ". . . no danger flowing
from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil appre-
hended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.
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"the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by
which we 'govern.' "'o It is the latter area which the "absolutists"
would remove from the sphere of governmental regulation. The "ab-
solutists" do not claim the distinction is clear-cut, but it is claimed and
demonstrated that some delineation is possible . 31 The primary criticism
of ad hoc balancing is that in applying the technique, court decisions
have not attempted to identify even those inviolate areas of free speech
which they impliedly recognize. 2
An example of the inconsistencies which ad hoc balancing permits
can be found in cases dealing with compulsory disclosure of organi-
zational membership lists. Where civil rights groups are involved, the
Court has asserted that "inviolability of privacy in group association
may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of free-
dom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident be-
liefs." '33 The state was denied access to membership lists, since it
could not demonstrate an interest sufficient to offset "the deterrent
effect which we have concluded these disclosures may well have on the
free exercise by petitioner's members of their constitutionally protected
right of association." 14
The same Court also stated: "Of course it is immaterial whether the
beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertains to political, eco-
nomic, religious or cultural matters. . .. ,, 135 Yet in cases where dis-
If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not en-
forced silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion).
This view was cited with approval in Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 395,
396 (1950), but was not followed because the non-Communist affidavits required of union
officials under the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, was designed to curtail con-
duct harmful to commerce rather than discourage the beliefs of Communists.
A year later the Court carried the balancing concept a step further in affirming con-
victions under the Smith Act, which made it a crime to advocate the overthrow of the
Government by force or violence, or to conspire to do so. Dennis v. United States,
supra note 104. The "clear and present danger" test was interpreted to permit action
by the State against "a group aiming at its overthrow [ready to] strike when the
leaders feel the circumstances permit." "Overthrow of the Government by force and
violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech.
." id. at 509.
130. See Mieklejohn, supra, note 128 at 255.
131. Id. at 256-263.
132. See Frantz, supra, note 120 at 1430.
133. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); accord, Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P.
366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
134. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, id. at 463.
135. Id. at 460.
1967]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
closure of Communist or "subversive" group membership was at stake,
the balance was struck in favor of federal 6 or state interests.117 In
Uphaus v. Wyman,'38 the disclosure of members of a summer camp
was justified even though "the nexus between World Fellowship [sum-
mer camp] and subversive activities may not be conclusive. . .. "
The distinguishing factor is said to be "the nature of the organiza-
tion", ' and that the Communist Party is not "an ordinary political
party." 14 This distinction is certainly justified, but it does not follow
that the activities of those even remotely associated with the movement
become a threat to national security. Yet if one conclusion may be
drawn from cases applying the "balancing" approach, it is that where
the government's "right of self-preservation" 1 is involved, the inter-
ests of the individual under the First Amendment will be subordinated.
The balance is struck in favor of the Government regardless of the
seriousness of the threat to national security. 4' Nor is it important that
any subversive activity actually exist. 44 Testimony concerning politi-
cal beliefs and associations may be compelled even though the witness
played no part in any questionable activity, 4 ' nor is it necessary that
the witness be associated with Communism. 40 Apparently it is not
136. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., supra note 110.
137. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 79.
140. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., supra note 110.
141. Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 109 at 128.
142. Barenblatt v. United States, id. at 128. See Bendich, First Amendment Standards
for Congressional Investigations, 51 CAL. L. REv. 311, 317-319.
143. "Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force, even though
doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists,
is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent. The damage which such attempts create
both physicially and politically to a nation makes it impossible to measure the validity
in terms of the probability of success, or the immediacy of a successful attempt." Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
144. "As the Barenblatt opinion makes clear, it is the nature of the Communist
activity involved, whether the momentary conduct is legitimate or illegitimate politically,
that establishes the Government's overbalancing interest." Wilkinson v. United States,
365 U.S. 399, 414 (1961).
145. "The subcommittee's legitimate legislative interest was not the activity in which
the petitioner might have happened to be engaged, but in the manipulation and infiltra-
tion of activities and organizations by persons advocating overthrow of the Govern-
ment." Id.
146. "Information about Communists is not the exclusive property of Communists.
Many persons innocent of Communist Party connections and bitterly hostile to Com-
munism may possess important information about such activities. Hence a belief in
showing that the Committee must have reason to believe the witness is or once was a
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even necessary that the committee have good reason to believe that the
witness has any useful information before issuing a subpoena, 147 so
long as there is no evidence that the summoning of the witness was the
result of "indiscriminate dragnet procedures lacking in probable cause
for belief that he possessed information which might be helpful." 14 All
presumptions appear to favor the committee.
It seems inconsistent for the Supreme Court to give such overriding
importance to the Government's "right of self-preservation" with re-
gard to the First Amendment, while the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination has consistently been held to bar any inter-
rogation concerning Communist activities.4'9 Apparently the interests
of the individual and the State in freedom of speech and association
is significantly less than their interest in avoiding self-accusation that
might lead to criminal pr'osecution. The explanation for this standard
of values is not included in the balancing process.
The "balancers" profess to weigh the competing interests at stake "in
the particular circumstances shown." '"0 Yet none would claim that
a thorough assessment in each case of all relevant data and political
theory is a practical or even possible procedure. Inevitably, some scale
of values and abstract principles must be accepted without proof be-
fore particular facts are considered. The necessary selection of values,
according to the "absolutists," was made by those who put the First
Amendment into the Constitution.
While Congress appears to have a heavy thumb on the scales of
Justice, the balancing process has produced results less favorable to
state investigations of subversive activities.151 Since Pennsylvania v.
Communist or in sympathy with them is unnecessary." Shelton v. United States, 280
F. 2d 701, 707, 708 (D. C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, Russell v. United States,
369 U.S. 749 (1962). The witness in this case was summoned as a result of mistaken
identification on the part of the Senate subcommittee. An undisclosed source had
suggested that one Willard Shelton, who worked for The New York Times, might have
useful information. After discovering that no such person worked for the newspaper,
Robert Shelton, who did work there, was subpoenaed by the committee's council. A
second conviction was reversed on procedural grounds, since the court thought the
committee itself should authorize the subpoenas. Shelton v. United States, 327 F. 2d
601 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
147. Shelton v. United States, 280 F. 2d 701, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
148. Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 109 at 134.
149. See, Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v. United States, 349
U.S. 190 (1955); Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
150. Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 109 at 126. See Bendich, First Amendment
Standards for Congressional Investigations, 51 CAL. L. REv., 311, 317-319 (1963).
151. See, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 (1957); Gibson v. Florida Legis-
lative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
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Nelson,152 holding that under the Smith Act Congress had preempted
the field in providing against subversion directed against the federal
government, state interest in such activities has been confined to sub-
version which threatens the state itself. This distinction not only limits
state probes to activity within its borders, but apparently gives state
interest less weight in the balance.
The most significant development in this area is DeGregory v. At-
torney General,5 3 where the Supreme Court for the first time found that
the first amendment rights, applicable to the states under the Four-
teenth Amendment, were not outweighed by governmental interests
in self-preservation. In this case appellant had been summoned to testify
in 1963 concerning his knowledge of Communist activities. He dis-
claimed any knowledge of these affairs since 1957, and refused to di-
vulge information concerning earlier periods. With the exception of
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,154 the Supreme Court had upheld previous
investigations by the Attorney General of New Hampshire. 5 5 Yet in
DeGregory the Court broke precedent:
[W]hatever justification may have supported such exposure in [Uphaus
v. Wyman' 56] is absent here; the staleness of both the basis for the
investigation and its subject matter makes indefensible such exposure
of one's associational and political past-exposure which is objection-
able and damaging in the extreme to one whose associations and
political views do not command majority approval. . . . There is no
showing of 'overriding and compelling state interest' . . . that would
warrant intrusion into the realm of political and associational privacy
protected by the First Amendment. The information being sought
was historical, not current .... The present record is devoid of any
evidence that there is any Communist movement in New Hampshire.15 7
[Citations omitted.]
The DeGregory case bodes ill for congressional investigations as
well. While the national interest weighs more heavily than that of
152. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
153. 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
154. Supra note 151. This case involved the contempt conviction of a classroom
teacher. The majority opinion emphasized the first amendment rights involved, but the
reversal was based on the lack of a clear indication that the information sought was
requested by the legislative authorization.
155. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); DeGregory v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 717
(1959); DeGregory v. Attorney General, 368 U.S. 19 (1961).
156. Id.
157. Supra note 153 at 828-830.
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a state, it nevertheless must be demonstrated. The infirmities of the
New Hampshire invesigation may be easily avoided by a committee
of Congress, but the scope of inquiry may be restricted in addition to
the pertinency requirement. DeGregory also indicates that the balance
between individual and state interests is delicate, and that govern-
mental interest in discouraging dissident beliefs for the sake of self-
preservation is not a constant.
While both the "balancing" and the "absolute" approaches may reach
the same conclusion, their effect is dissimilar. Under the "absolute"
interpretation, the interests are weighed in advance, and the conclusion
is inevitable. Hence the "absolute" approach would be preventative,
voiding certain types of congressional investigations altogether. The
"balancing" approach, with its unpredictable results, would have only
the proscriptive effect which the facts of the case required.
The decisions of the Supreme Court since 1961 leave little doubt
that a majority of the Court finds certain procedures of the Un-
American Activities Committee and similar bodies highly objectionable.
If it be conceded that such procedures should be eradicated, it is clear
from the recurrence of contempt cases that reversal on narrow grounds
-lack of pertinency, lack of authority, or through a delicate "balanc-
ing" of interests-is an inadequate approach.
CONCLUSION
It is clear beyond question that the power of Congress to inform
itself and the public is both necessary and proper. It is likewise indis-
putable that Congress has authority to inquire and legislate in the area
of subversion. No court should or would deny Congress access to vital
or even useful information where the means employed to obtain that
information are reasonable. It would seem that where public and private
interests conflict in the area of legislative investigations, the obvious
approach by the courts would be to determine whether the methods
selected by a committee to gather information were necessary and
appropriate under the circumstances. As yet courts have failed to give
more than a passing reference to this question of reasonableness. They
have accepted without question the determination by Congress and its
committees of not only what information is required, but also how it is
to be obtained. While it is not contended that the motives of commit-
tee members are anything but noble or that the judicial policy of non-
interference in congressional matters is less than desirable, it is difficult
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to see why the time-honored theory of judicial review applies with
less force to congressional investigations. No doubt Communists could
give valuable insight into their nefarious activities to a committee. But
it is unrealistic to expect them to openly confess their criminal con-
spiracies under the threat of a contempt conviction when they have
only to hide behind the Fifth Amendment. Nor is it likely that wit-
nesses would disclose unpopular activities and associations which would
subject them to social and economic reprisals.
For every witness refusing to testify there are others not only will-
ing but eager, and presumably the sources of information used by
government internal security agencies are available to Congress. Just
how the legislative function of Congress is furthered by summoning
witnesses that obviously will not testify is apparently something only
committeemen and judges can comprehend. It is also difficult to per-
ceive how the denial of First Amendment rights makes available in-
formation which could be obtained in no other way.
What is clear is that persons have been subjected to criminal prosecu-
tion merely for relying on the equivocal language of Supreme Court
decisions. An inevitable by-product of compelling disclosure of dissi-
dent political beliefs is the subtle repression of honest dissent. The Con-
stitution no where indicates that those who denounce its philosophy
are not entitled to its protections. It provides a single set of rules, one of
them being that the courts, and not Congress, shall mete out punish-
ment.
Self-restraint, like constructive legislative proposals, has not been a
conspicuous feature of the thirty-year record of the House Un-Ameri-
can Activities Committee. Congress has repeatedly disclaimed respon-
sibility for the committee's activities, relying on the courts to protect
individual rights. In light of these facts judicial restraint comes to little
more than judicial retreat-hopefully not a rout.
Kent B. Millikan
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